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I. Introduction
Self-determination has haunted Portuguese foreign policy ever since it was 
expressly recognized on the Declaration on the Granting of  Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples of  14 December 1960.1 The staunch refusal to decolonize 
became the Achilles heel of  Portuguese diplomacy,2 which was unable to avoid the 
gradual transformation of  the country into a pariah in the international society.3 The 
“carnation revolution” from 25 April 1974 brought democracy and the rule of  law, but 
also a chaotic decolonization at the peak of  the cold war, which left one colony (East 
Timor) occupied and annexed by a neighbouring State (Indonesia). Guilt complex 
turned the self-determination of  the Timorese people into a national cause that 
crossed the political spectrum and a leitmotiv of  foreign policy. The independence of  
East Timor (2002) was a moment of  triumph (and joy) of  Portuguese diplomacy (and 
people).
Dealing with Western Sahara’s self-determination was always a conundrum. 
Portugal does not recognize the annexation of  Western Sahara by Morocco and 
supports the UN efforts to secure a political solution for the conflict that would allow 
the Sahrawi people to exercise their right to self-determination,4 while simultaneously 
electing Morocco as a prime partner for economic diplomacy with whom it has 
strengthened political ties through the adoption of  international agreements in multiple 
fields.5 
1 “Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not 
yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of  those territories, without any conditions or reservations, 
in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to 
enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom”. UN Assembly General Resolution 1514 (XV) on 
the Declaration on the Granting of  Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (December 14, 
1960), para.5.
2 According to Salazar, the de facto leader of  the “Estado Novo” regime, “(t)he fact of  a territory proclaiming 
its independence is a natural phenomenon in human societies and, therefore, it is a hypothesis that is always admissible”, 
“but indeed no one can or ought to set a time limit for it. What is being subjected to timetables is the inconceivable politics 
of  our time, which claim that states should set a time limit to destroy their unity and break up” (Gene Farmer, 
“Dictator on the Defensive. An Exclusive Talk with Portugal’s Enigmatic Salazar”, Time Magazine, 
May 4, 1962, 99).
3 See Bruno Cardoso Reis, “Portugal and the UN: A Rogue State Resisting the Norm of  Decolonization 
(1956–1974)”, Portuguese Studies 29, No. 2 (2013): 251-76.
4 “(Portugal) supports a just and lasting solution that would provide for self-determination of  the people 
of  Western Sahara” (Declaration of  vote of  the Representative of  Portugal, UN General Assembly, 
Fourth Committee, 9th Meeting, “Fourth Committee Approves Text on Western Sahara at Conclusion 
of  Debate on Decolonization Issues”, GA/SPD/348, October 13, 2006). See also: Ministério dos 
Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta à pergunta No. 494/XI/1. Ofício No. 57, de 7 de janeiro de 2010”, 
Diário da Assembleia da República, Série B, No. 33/XI/1, January 8, 2010, 193; Ministério dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros, “Resposta à pergunta No. 1428/XX/2. Ofício No. 1659, de 4 de abril de 2013”, Diário da 
Assembleia da República, Série B, No. 132/XII/2, April 8, 2013, 101; Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 
“Resposta à pergunta No. 1030/XII/2. Ofício No. 4010, de 19 de setembro de 2013”, available at https://
www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalhePerguntaRequerimento.aspx?BID=74716 
(accessed on June 25, 2019); Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta à pergunta No. 
1176/XII/4. Ofício No. 3714, de 23 de junho de 2015”, available at https://www.parlamento.pt/
ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalhePerguntaRequerimento.aspx?BID=86443 (accessed on June, 
25, 2019); or Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta à pergunta No. 3107/XIII/1. Ofício 
No. 5349, de 12 de outubro de 2016”, available at https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/
Paginas/DetalhePerguntaRequerimento.aspx?BID=96088 (accessed on June 25, 2019). 
5 Madalina Dobrescu, Tobias Schumacher and Stelios Stavridis, “Southern Europe: Portugal, Spain, 
Italy, Malta, Greece, Cyprus” in Foreign Policies of  EU Member States: Continuity and Europeanisation, ed. 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2019
105 Francisco Pereira Coutinho
However, there is no diplomatic magic that allows for one “having a cake and 
eating it too”. Not even the Portuguese. On the one hand, on 11 May 2018, the 
Portuguese Parliament approved a vote of  solidarity, proposed by the Communist 
Party and voted by the Socialist Party, which declares that a “fair and lasting solution 
for the Western Sahara conflict requires the end of  Morocco’s illegal occupation of  
Western Sahara and its policy of  disrespect for the rights of  the Sahrawi people” , and 
calls on the government to deliver a foreign policy in international institutions which 
supports the right to self-determination of  the Sahrawi people.6 On the other hand, 
on 28 January 2019 and 4 March 2019, respectively, the Portuguese Government – 
also Socialist – voted the approval of  European Union (EU) Council decisions which 
expressly extend to Western Sahara the application of  EU/Morocco agreements.7 The 
Council decisions are a reaction to the Court of  Justice’s rulings in Front Polisario and 
Western Sahara Campaign, which declared that EU/Morocco agreements could not be 
applied in Western Sahara as that would be incompatible with the principles of  self-
determination and of  the relative effect of  Treaties.8 
In this article, I argue that the territorial extension to Western Sahara of  EU/
Morocco agreements is invalid under the Treaties because it breaches international law, 
namely the EU’s obligation of  non-recognition of  an unlawful situation, which is the 
occupation and annexation of  Western Sahara by Morocco (sections one to four). The 
Portuguese Government’s endorsement of  the EU/Morocco agreements is consistent 
with previous practice,9 which is reflected in the written interventions presented in 
Front Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign, but directly contradicts the Parliament’s call 
(section five).
Amelia Hadfield, Ian Manners, Richard G. Whitman (Routledge, 2017), 90.
6 Voto No. 537/XIII/3, “De solidariedade com o povo saraui pelo respeito e concretização do seu 
direito à autodeterminação, apresentado pelo PCP e subscrito por uma Deputada do PS, que foi 
aprovado”, Diário da Assembleia da República, I Série, No. 84, May 12, 2018, 60-61.
7 Council Decision (EU) 2019/217 of  28 January 2019 on the conclusion of  the agreement in the 
form of  an Exchange of  Letters between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco on the amendment 
of  Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of  the one part, and the Kingdom of  Morocco, 
of  the other part. Council Decision (EU) 2019/441 of  4 March 2019 on the conclusion of  the 
Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco, the 
Implementation Protocol thereto and the Exchange of  Letters accompanying the Agreement. 
According to media reports, Sweden was the only Member State which abstained on the amendment 
to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (EuroMesco, “EU Council adopts decision amending its 
Association Agreement with Morocco and concludes negotiations on the fishery agreement with 
Morocco”, July 24, 2018, available at https://www.euromesco.net/news/eu-council-adopts-decision-
amending-its-association-agreement-with-morocco-and-concludes-negotiations-on-the-fishery-
agreement-with-morocco/) (accessed on June 15, 2019) and voted against the fisheries agreement 
(Western Sahara Resource Watch, “European Council approves new fish deal, Sweden objects”, 
December 6, 2018, available at https://www.wsrw.org/a105x4346 (accessed on June 15, 2019).
8 Judgment of  December 21, 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C-104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, para. 
123, and Court of  Justice, judgment of  February 27, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, C-266/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:118, para. 63.
9 “(…) (T)he Fisheries Agreement between the (EU) and Morocco does not breach the international 
legislation applicable to Western Sahara” (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Pergunta No. 1917/
XI/1”, March 16, 2010, Diário da Assembleia da República, Série B, No. 111/XI/1, de April 27, 2010, 
149). See also Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta à pergunta No. 494/XI/1. Ofício 
No. 57, de 7 de janeiro”, Diário da Assembleia da República, Série B, No. 33/XI/1, January 8, 2010, 193. 
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II. The endless tale of  Africa’s last colony
After the Berlin Conference of  1884, Spain colonised the Western Sahara, a 
desertic territory bathed by the Atlantic Ocean located to the south of  the Canary 
Islands which was then inhabited by nomad Berber tribes. 
A few weeks before the adoption of  the Declaration on the Granting of  
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Spain recognized Western Sahara 
as a non-autonomous territory and started to provide information about the territory 
to the Secretary-General of  the UN pursuant to Chapter XI of  the UN Charter.10 
Notwithstanding multiple UN General Assembly resolutions affirming the right of  
the Sahrawi people to self-determination,11 only after Franco’s withdrawal from the 
executive office did Spain inform the UN Secretary General United of  its decision of  
calling a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara in the first six months of  
1975 under UN supervision.12
The organization of  a referendum on self-determination ran against the interests 
of  Morocco, which from the outset of  its own independence in 1956 considered the 
Western Sahara to be a part of  its territory.13 Moroccan sovereignty claims over Western 
Sahara were rebuffed in an Advisory Opinion of  the International Court of  Justice: 
The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the 
time of  Spanish colonisation, of  legal ties of  allegiance between the Sultan of  Morocco 
and some of  the tribes living in the territory of  Western Sahara. They equally show the 
existence of  rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal 
ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of  
Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court’s conclusion is that the materials and 
information presented to it do not establish any tie of  territorial sovereignty between 
the territory of  Western Sahara and the Kingdom of  Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. 
Thus the Court has not found legal ties of  such a nature as might affect the application 
of  [Resolution of  the UN General Assembly of  14 December 1960, 1514 (XV) on the 
granting of  independence to colonial countries and peoples (‘Resolution 1514 (XV)’)] 
in the decolonization of  Western Sahara and, in particular, of  the principle of  self-
determination through the free and genuine expression of  the will of  the peoples of  
the Territory.14
Morocco was not convinced. Considering that “everyone” had recognized that 
Western Sahara belonged to Morocco and that “it only remained for the Moroccans 
to occupy (their) territory”, King Hassan II of  Morocco ordered a “peaceful march” 
towards Western Sahara which included 350 000 persons.15 The “Green March” was 
deplored by the Security Council, which called upon Morocco to immediately withdraw 
10 United Nations (UN) General Assembly (Fourth Committee), 1047th Meeting of  November 11, 
1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1047.
11 UN General Assembly Resolution 2072 (XX) (December 16, 1965); UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2229 (XXI) (December 20, 1966); UN General Assembly Resolution 2354 (XXII) 
(December 19, 1967).
12 Letter of  August 20, 1974 of  the Spanish Ambassador to the UN Secretary General José quoted 
by Ignacio Algueró Cuervo, El Sahara y España: claves de una descolonización pendiente (Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife: Idea, 2006), 407.
13 Judgment of  the General Court of  December 10, 2015, Front Polisario v Council, T-512/12, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, para. 1.
14 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of  October 16, 1975, ICJ Reports 1975, 12, para. 162.
15 Judgment of  the General Court of  December 10, 2015, Front Polisario v Council, T-512/12, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, para. 9.
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from the territory of  Western Sahara all the participants in the march.16 Morocco 
complied a few days later.17
Shortly afterwards, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania adopted the “Madrid 
Agreement”, which established a temporary tripartite administration of  Western 
Sahara with the collaboration of  the Yema’a.18 The agreement foresaw the termination 
of  the Spanish presence in Western Sahara to be completed by 28 February 1976 at 
the latest, and that “the views of  the Saharan population, expressed through the Yema’a, [would] 
be respected”.19 Two days before the deadline, Spain informed the UN Secretary General 
that of  that date, it was definitely terminating its presence in Western Sahara and 
considered itself  exempted from any international responsibility stemming from the 
administration of  that territory.20
After the Spanish retreat, an armed conflict started in Western Sahara between 
Morocco and Mauritania, on one side, and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de 
Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro (“Front Polisario”), the Sahrawy national liberation 
movement created on 10 May 1973,21 on the other.  The Western Sahara was effectively 
partitioned between Morocco (the northern two-thirds) and Mauritania (the remaining 
third in the south).22 In the interior regions bordered to Algeria which it was able to 
control, the Polisario Front proclaimed on 27 February 1976 the Saharan (Sahrawi) 
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR),23 which aspires to the administration over the 
whole Western Sahara.24
A peace agreement between Mauritania and Front Polisario was reached on 10 
August 1979 under which Mauritania renounced to any territorial claim to Western 
16 Resolution 380 (1975) (November 6, 1975), para. 2
17 Advocate General Wathelet, Opinion delivered on January 10, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, 
C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, para. 155.
18 The Yema’a was an advisory body established in 1967 by the Spanish administration composed 
of  103 members, including the mayors of  large towns, tribal chiefs (sheiks), representatives of  
family groups and representatives of  professional groups of  Western Sahara. See Advocate General 
Wathelet, Western Sahara Campaign, C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, footnote 115. 
19 “Declaration of  Principles on Western Sahara by Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, of  14 November 
1975”, UNTS, Vol. 988, 1975, 259.
20 “Letter Dated 26 February 1976 from the Permanent Representative of  Spain to the UN Addressed 
to the Secretary-General (February 26, 1976)”, UN Doc A/3156 S/11997, 2-3.
21 According to Article 1 of  its constituting document, the Front Polisario is “a national liberation 
movement, the fruit of  the long resistance of  the Sahrawi people against the various forms of  foreign 
occupation” (Court of  Justice, judgment of  February 27, 2018, Council v Front Polisario, C-104/16 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, para. 21).
22 Article 1 of  the Convention on the line of  the State border established between the Islamic Republic 
of  Mauritania and the Kingdom of  Morocco, signed in Rabat on  April 14, 1976, UNTS, Vol. 1035, 
I-15406, 1977, determined that the frontier was defined by a straight line running from the point at 
which the Atlantic coastline intersects the 24th parallel North to the point of  intersection of  the 23rd 
parallel North and the 13th meridian West.
23 In 2018, the SADR was recognized by forty-six States [Stephen Orvis, Carol Ann Drogus, Introducing 
Comparative Politics: Concepts and Cases in Context, 4th Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2018), 40]. 
The recognition of  the SADR by the Organization of  the African Union (now African Union) led 
Morocco to leave the organization in November 1984, only to return on January 2017 (Abdellah Saaf, 
“Morocco’s great return to the African Union”, Policy Brief, OCP Policy Center, February 2017, 1-2). 
Although it does not recognize the SADR, Portugal keeps informal contacts with representatives of  
the Polisario Front [Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta ao Requerimento No. 1246/
VII/1.ª Ofício No. 2554, de 9 de setembro de 1996”, Diário da Assembleia da República, Série B, No. 36/
VII/1 Supl., October, 10, 1996, 222 (19)].
24 Clemens Feinäugle, “Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion)”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public 
International Law, cood. Rüdiger Wolfrum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), para. 18.
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Sahara.25 Morocco immediately stated that it would not agree to the creation of  a 
“mini-State under the Front (Polisario) in Mauritania’s sector of  Western Sahara”26, and 
swiftly occupied and formally annexed the former Mauritanian territory in Western 
Sahara on 24 August 1979.27  
On 21 November 1979, the UN General Assembly “reaffirm(ed) the inalienable right 
of  the people of  Western Sahara to self-determination and independence”, “deeply deplore(d) the 
aggravation of  the situation resulting from the continued occupation of  Western Sahara by Morocco”, 
“urge(d) Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of  the Territory of  
Western Sahara” and “recommend(ed) to that end that the (Front Polisario), the representative of  
the people of  Western Sahara, should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive 
political solution of  the question of  Western Sahara, in accordance with the resolutions and declarations 
of  the (UN).”28
The conflict between Morocco and the Front Polisario continued until a ceasefire, 
brokered by the UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar, was agreed on 30 August 1988 
and later implemented from 6 September 1991.29 Both parties accepted, in principle, 
to the organization of  a referendum on self-determination under UN supervision.30 
Since then, no significative progress towards allowing the people of  Western 
Sahara to exercise its right to self-determination through a referendum has been 
achieved.31 The identification of  the voters eligible to participate in a referendum was 
completed in May 2003 by an independent commission, but the parties continued 
to hold different views on the matter.32 The second version of  the Baker plan which 
envisioned Sahrawi self-rule under a Western Sahara Authority for a period of  four to 
five years, with a referendum on independence also opened to permanent residents in 
the Western Sahara to follow,33 was shortly afterwards endorsed by the UN Security 
Council,34 accepted by the Polisario Front, but formally rejected by Morocco, saying 
that it would no longer agree to any referendum which included independence as an 
25 Mauritano-Sahraoui Agreement, signed at Algiers (August 10, 1979). See annex to “Letter from the 
Permanent Representative of  Mauritania to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General” (August 18, 
1979), U.N. Doc. A/34/427 S/13503, August 20, 1979.
26 “Report of  the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of  the 
Declaration on the Granting of  Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, (A/34/23/Rev.1), 
Official Documents of  the General Assembly, Vol. II, 1977, 105-17, para. 32. 
27 According to Advocate General Wathelet, Opinion delivered on January 10, 2018, Western Sahara 
Campaign, C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, footnotes 44 and 45, the southern part of  Western Sahara 
was incorporated into Morocco by Law (dahir) 2-79-430, August 14, 1979, Bulletin official du Royaume 
du Maroc, No. 3485, 489, and the northern part by Law 1-76-468 of  August 6, 1976, Bulletin official du 
Royaume du Maroc, No. 3328, 914.
28 U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/37 (November 21, 1979), paras. 1, 5 and 7.
29 “Letter Dated 8 July 1991 from the Secretary General Addressed to the Presidente of  the Security 
Council”, U. N. Doc. S/22779, July 10, 1991. 
30 Report of  the UN Secretary General, “The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara”, U. N. Doc. 
S/21360, June 18, 1990, 4. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 690 (1991) (April 29, 1991) 
creating the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (‘MINURSO’) with the mandate to 
monitor the ceasefire and to organize and ensure a free and fair referendum. MINURSO’s mandate 
was extended until 30 October 2019 by the Security Council Resolution 2468 (2019) (April 30, 2019). 
31 Advocate General Wathelet, Opinion delivered on January 10, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, 
C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, para. 181. 
32 Thilo Marauhn, “Sahara”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public International Law, coord. Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), paras. 33 and 34.
33 UN Security Council, “Report of  the Secretary-General on the situation concerning the Western 
Sahara”, U. N. Doc. S/2003/565, May 23, 2003, Annex II.
34 Resolution 1495 (2003) (July 31, 2003).
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option.35 This stand has frozen the political process because the Polisario Front (and 
Algeria) will not accept a solution of  autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty that does 
not stem from a referendum. It is thus not foreseeable that the “new momentum”, 
as the Security Council framed it in April 2019, 36 created by round-table meetings 
between the parties and mutual commitments to engage in the UN political process, 
will lead to any substantial development on this thorny issue in the near future.
III. Have the Sahrawi people exercised their right to self-
determination?
According to Principle VI of  UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), the 
right to self-determination of  a Non-Self-Governing territory such as the Western 
Sahara entails a choice between three options: i) independence; ii) association with 
another independent State; and iii) integration within an independent State. Such 
choice must reflect the “freely expressed will and desire” of  the people concerned.37 
Morocco argues that the Sahrawi people freely chose for Western Sahara to 
became an integrant part of  its territory through an oath of  allegiance to the King 
of  Morocco pronounced on behalf  of  the Saharawi tribes by the President of  the 
Yema’a (Khatri Ould Said a Ould El Jomaini) at a ceremony held on 4 November 
1975 at the Palace of  the Municipality of  Agadir,38 and through a decision of  the 
extraordinary meeting of  the Yema’a held on 26 February 1976 which “expressed the 
unanimous opinion of  the Saharawi populations and all the tribes of  which it is the 
emanation and the authentic and legitimate representative”.39 However, not only could 
the President of  the Yema’a possibly claim to represent Sahrawi people, but also the 
meeting of  26 February 1976 was not attended by approximately two-thirds (67) of  the 
members of  the Yema’a. These members of  the Yema’a unanimously had adopted, on 
28 November 1975, the “Guelta Proclamation” which: i) declares that the Yema’a was 
not democratically elected by the people of  Western Sahara and thus could not decide 
on its self-determination, ii) dissolves the Yema’a, and iii) considers the Polisario Front 
35 “Reply of  the Kingdom of  Morocco to Mr. Baker’s Proposal Entitled «Peace Plan for the Self-
Determination of  Western Sahara»”, in Security Council, “Report of  the Secretary-General on the 
Situation Concerning Western Sahara”, U. N. Doc. S/2004/325, April 23, 2004, 10-11. The first version 
of  the Baker plan [Security Council, “Report of  the Secretary-General on the situation concerning 
the Western Sahara”, S/2001/603, June 20, 2001, Annex I (“Framework agreement on the Status of  
Western Sahara”)], which included a proposal for Western Saharan autonomy within the Moroccan 
State, was rejected by both the Polisario Front and Algeria (Thilo Marauhn, “Sahara”, para. 34).
36 Resolution 2468 (2019), April 30, 2019, recital 4.
37 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) (December 14, 1960), para. 5.
38 “I have come on behalf  of  all the inhabitants and tribes of  the Sahara to render Your Majesty the allegiance of  
our ancestors. I have come out of  patriotism because Sahara is an integral part of  Morocco. We have never ceased to 
be Moroccans. When we saw that we had become a pawn, that our fate was literally put at risk by the appetites and 
ambitions of  some, we decided to say what we think, loudly and clearly” (“Record of  the 1954th Meeting of  the 
Security Council on 6 November 1975”, S/PV.1854, February 29, 1984, para. 47). See also “Report of  
8 November 1975 by the Secretary-General in application of  Resolution 379 (1975) on the situation 
concerning Western Sahara”, U. N. Doc. S/11874, November 8, 1975, para. 17. 
39 Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, Vol. 15, (1976), 847-48. In a message to the UN Secretary-General, the 
President of  the Yema’a informed that “the Saharan Yema’a, meeting in special session today, Thursday February 
26, 1976, in El Aaiun, has unanimously approved the reintegration of  the Territory of  the Sahara with Morocco and 
Mauritania, in conformity with the historical realities and with the links which have always united the Saharan population to 
these two countries” (“Report of  the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation 
of  the Declaration on the Granting of  Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, U.N. Doc. 
A/31/23/Rev.1, Official Documents of  the General Assembly, Vol. II, 1977, 203-25, para. 51).
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as the only legitime representative of  the Sahrawi people.40 Not surprisingly, neither 
the UN nor Spain, as the administering Power of  Western Sahara and member of  the 
interim administration of  Western Sahara established under the Madrid agreement, 
have recognized the oath or the Yema’a meeting of  26 February 1976 as reflecting the 
exercise of  the right self-determination by the people of  Western Sahara.41
Multiple Assembly General and Security Council Resolutions which have dealt 
with Western Sahara have stressed the need for the organization of  a referendum on 
self-determination under UN supervision.42 Notwithstanding having agreed in principle 
to this methodology for the exercise of  self-determination by the Sahrawi people,43 
Morocco integrated Western Sahara in its territory by partition and annexation without 
consulting the people of  Western Sahara and without UN supervision.44 It currently 
exercises a military occupation of  roughly 80% of  Western Sahara,45 including the 
coastline and the rich phosphate mining areas, and has built a 2,000 km wall of  sand 
to separate and protect that territory from the area controlled by Front Polisario.46 A 
considerable number of  refugees from Western Sahara live in camps administered by 
Front Polisario, situated in Algerian territory close to Western Sahara.47 Being a clear 
breach of  the right to self-determination, which is a legally enforceable right erga omnes 
and one of  the essential principles of  international law,48 Moroccan annexation of  
Western Sahara is not recognized by a single State.49
IV. The application of  EU/Morocco agreements to the Western 
Sahara
Morocco is a key element of  the European Neighbourhood Policy, ranking first as 
a recipient of  EU funding under the European Neighbourhood Instrument.50 Fighting 
40 “Une date historique: la proclamation de Guelta”, Sahara Info 60, 1982, VIII, paras. 1-3.
41 Advocate General Wathelet, Opinion delivered on January 10, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, 
C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, paras. 172-174 and 184.
42 V. g. UN General Assembly Resolution 2229 (XXI) (December 20, 1966), paras. 4 and 5; UN 
Security Council Resolution 621 (1988) (September 20, 1988), para. 2; UN General Assembly 
Resolution 43/33 (November 22, 1988), para. 4; or UN Security Council Resolution 1084 (November 
27, 1996), para. 1.
43 Report of  the UN Secretary General, “The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara”, U. N. Doc. 
S/21360, June 28, 1990, 4.
44 Advocate General Wathelet, Opinion delivered on January 20, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, 
C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, para. 183. 
45 “(A) (t)erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of  (an) hostile 
army” [Article 42 of  Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of  War and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of  War (The Hague Convention), adopted on October 
10, 1907 (entered into force January 26, 2010)]. 
46 The wall, better known as “the Berm”, is the longest defensive fortification in use today, and the 
second-longest ever, after China’s Great Wall (Nicolas Niarchos, “Is One of  Africa’s Oldests Conflicts 
Nearing its End?”, The New Yorker, December 29, 2018, available at https://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/is-one-of-africas-oldest-conflicts-finally-nearing-its-end, June 10, 2019).
47 Judgment of  the General Court of  December 10, 2015, Front Polisario v Council, T-512/12, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, para. 16.
48 International Court of  Justice, East Timor (Portugal v Australia), judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, para. 
29, and “Legal Consequences of  the Construction of  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, paras. 88 and 156.
49 Sven Simon, “Western Sahara”, in Self-determination and Secession in International Law, ed. Christian 
Walter, Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Kavus Abushov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 261.
50 Members’ Research Service, “How the EU Budget is Spent: European Neighbourhood Instrument”, 
European Parliamentary Research Service Blog, November 22, 2016, available at https://epthinktank.
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terrorism and controlling illegal migration are major European political priorities which 
have to be dealt with with the collaboration of  North African countries.51
EU/Morocco legal relations are structured by the Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement, which is an Association Agreement signed in 1996.52 Under the scope 
of  this agreement, the parties signed, inter alia, a Fisheries Partnership Agreement53 
and a Fishing Protocol54, as well as an agreement liberalizing (processed) agricultural 
and fishery products (“Liberalisation Agreement”)55 and a aviation agreement.56 
These agreements apply to “the territory of  the Kingdom of  Morocco” (Article 
94 of  the Association Agreement), to “the territory of  Morocco and to the waters 
under Moroccan jurisdiction” (Article 11 of  the Fisheries Partnership Agreement), to 
“Moroccan fishing zone(s)” (v. g. Article 2 of  the Fishing Protocol), to Moroccan “land 
areas (mainland and islands), internal waters and territorial sea under its sovereignty or 
jurisdiction” [Article 1 (15) of  the aviation agreement], and to products originating in 
Morocco [Article 17 (1) of  the Association Agreement as amended by the Liberalisation 
Agreement].
Claiming that the Morocco/EU agreements were also being applied in Western 
Sahara, Front Polisario and a NGO (Western Sahara Campaign UK) brought several 
actions (before the General Court of  the EU and an English court) where they argued 
for the invalidity of  the EU law acts that had approved those agreements, namely on 
the ground that they are contrary to the general principles of  EU law and to Article 3 
(5) of  the Treaty of  the European Union (TEU), under which the Union is required to 
respect international law.57
eu/2016/11/22/how-the-eu-budget-is-spent-european-neighbourhood-instrument/ (June 11, 2019).
51 Guillaume Van der Loo, “The Dilemma of  the EU’s Future Trade Relations with Western Sahara. 
Caught between strategic interests and international law?”, CEPS, April 20, 2018, 5.
52 The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of  the one part, and the Kingdom of  Morocco, of  the other 
part, was signed in Brussels on 26 February 1996 (OJ 2000 L 70, 2) and approved on behalf  of  the 
Communities by Council and Commission Decision 2000/204/EC, ECSC of  24 January 2000 (OJ 
2000 L 70, 1). Pursuant to Article 96 of  the Agreement, it entered into force on 1 March 2000 (OJ 
2000 L 70, 228).
53 Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of  Morocco 
(OJ 2006 L 141, 4), as approved and implemented by Council Regulation (EC) 764/2006 of  22 May 
2006. Pursuant to Article 17 of  that regulation, it entered into force on 28 February 2007 (OJ 2007 
L 78, 31). 
54 Protocol between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and 
financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Agreement (OJ 2013 L 328, 2). The conclusion 
of  the protocol was approved by Council Decision 2013/785/EU of  December 16, 2013. It entered 
into force on 15 July 2014 (OJ 2014 L 228, 1).
55 Agreement in the form of  an Exchange of  Letters between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco 
concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural 
products, fish and fishery products, the replacement of  Protocols 1, 2 and 3 and their Annexes 
and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of  the one part, and the Kingdom of  Morocco, 
of  the other part, was signed in Brussels on December 13, 2010 (OJ 2012 L 241, 4), before being 
approved on behalf  of  the EU by the Council Decision 2012/497/EU, of  March 8, 2012. It entered 
into force on October 1, 2012 (OJ 2012 L 255, 1).
56 Euro-Mediterranean aviation agreement between the European Community and its Member States, 
of  the one part and the Kingdom of  Morocco, of  the other part (OJ 2006 L 386, 57), as approved 
by Council Decision (EU) 2018/146 of  22 January 2018. It entered into force on 19 March 2018 (OJ 
2019 L 6, 1).
57 General Court, judgment of  December 10, 2015, Front Polisario v Council, T-512/12, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, para. 159 and 200; Court of  Justice, judgment of  February 27, 2018, Western 
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On a judgement from 10 December 2015, the General Court started by recalling 
that there is a divergence between the views of  the EU and Morocco as to the 
international status of  Western Sahara. While Morocco considers the Western Sahara 
to be an integral part of  its territory, neither the Union nor its Member States recognizes 
that territorial claim. However, EU institutions were well aware that the Moroccan 
authorities were applying the provisions of  the agreements to the part of  Western 
Sahara it controlled and did not oppose that application. A subsequent practice had 
thus developed, which according to Article 31 (3) (b) of  the Vienna Convention of  the 
Law of  the Treaties leads to an interpretation of  the agreements as applying to Western 
Sahara.58 
Front Polisario’s argument that there is, under international law and EU law, an 
absolute prohibition against concluding an international agreement on behalf  of  the 
EU which may be applied to a territory in fact controlled by a non-member State, 
without the sovereignty of  that State over that territory being recognized by the EU 
and its Member States or, more generally, by all other States, was rejected.59 The General 
Court considered that EU institutions enjoy a wide discretion as regards whether it is 
appropriate to conclude an agreement with a non-member State which will be applied 
on a disputed territory such as the Western Sahara.60 However, the Council had an 
obligation – which it failed to fulfil – to examine in advance all the relevant facts of  the 
individual case, and in particular to ensure that the application of  the agreement was 
not carried out in a manner detrimental to the population of  that territory and did not 
entail infringements of  fundamental rights of  the persons concerned. Accordingly, the 
Council decision that adopted the Liberalisation Agreement in so far as it approved its 
application to Western Sahara was annulled.61
Called on appeal by the Council, the Court of  Justice overturned the judgment 
of  the General Court and dismissed the action brought by Front Polisario by declaring 
that the EU/Morocco agreements are not applicable in Western Sahara. 
The Court of  Justice considered that the concept of  “territory of  the Kingdom 
of  Morocco” included in the Association Agreement could only be construed as 
referring to the geographical area over which Morocco exercises the fullness of  the 
powers granted to sovereign entities by international law, to the exclusion of  any other 
territory, such as that of  Western Sahara.62 
If  the territory of  Western Sahara was to be included within the scope of  the 
Association Agreement, that would be contrary to certain rules of  general international 
law applicable in the relations between the EU and Morocco. First, it would breach the 
principle of  self-determination, stated in Article 1 of  the UN Charter, disregarding 
the “separate and distinct” status accorded by the international community to Western 
Sahara Campaign, C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:118, para. 32; General Court, order of  November 30, 
2018, Front Polisario v Council, T-275/18, ECLI:EU:T:2018:869, para. 25.
58 Judgment of  10 December 2015, Front Polisario v Council, T-512/12, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, paras. 
103. The rules laid down in the Vienna Convention of  the Law of  Treaties of  May 23, 1969 (UNTS, 
Vol. 1155, 331) apply to an agreement concluded between a State and an international organisation in 
so far as the rules are an expression of  general international customary law (Judgement of  the Court 
of  Justice of  February 25, 2010, Brita, C-386/08, EU:C:2010:91, para. 41).
59 Judgment of  the General Court of  December 20, 2015, Front Polisario v Council, T-512/12, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, para. 215.
60 Id., para. 216-22.
61 Id., para. 223-47.
62 Judgment of  December 21, 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C-104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, paras. 95 
and 132.
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Sahara, which is listed since 1963 as a non-self-governing territory within the meaning 
of  Article 73 of  the UN Charter. Secondly, it would breach the principle of  the relative 
effect of  treaties under which a treaty must neither impose any obligations nor confer 
any rights on third States without their consent.63 According to the Court, the people 
of  Western Sahara must be regarded as a “third party” within the meaning of  the 
pacta tertiis principle. As such, the implementation of  the EU/Morocco agreements 
in Western Sahara had to receive the consent of  the representatives of  the people of  
Western Sahara, and whether such implementation was likely to bring harm or benefit 
to that people was irrelevant.64
The same reasoning was adopted by the Court of  Justice65 and by the General 
Court66 to exclude the application to Western Sahara of  the fisheries and the aviation 
agreements.67
63 This general principle of  international law, which is codified in Article 34 of  the Vienna Convention 
of  the Law of  the Treaties, was applied by the Court of  Justice in Brita, where it found that products 
originating in the occupied Palestinian territorial do not fall within the territorial scope of  the EU/Israel 
Associated Agreement (judgement of  February 25, 2010, C-386/08, EU:C:2010:91, paras. 52-53).
64  Judgment of  December 21, 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C-104/16, paras. 88-93, 100, 103-107 and 
123-124. 
65 Court of  Justice, judgment of  February 27, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign UK, C-266/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:118, para. 85. This ruling led the General Court to declared that Front Polisario had 
no standing to seek the annulment of  the fisheries protocol (order of  July 19, 2018, Front Polisario v 
Council, T-180/14, ECLI:EU:T:2018:496, para. 70).
66 General Court, order of  November 30, 2018, Front Polisario v Council, T-275/18, ECLI:EU:T:2018:869, 
paras. 31-41.
67 The application of  international law in the Front Polisario rulings was both praised and criticized in the 
legal literature. See Álvaro De Elera, “The Frente Polisario Judgements: An Assessment in the Light of  
the Court of  Justice’s Case Law on Territorial Disputes”, in The EU as a Global Actor: Bridging Theory and 
Practice, Liber Amicorum in hounour of  Ricardo Gosalbo Bono, ed. Jeno Czuczai and Frederik Naert (Brill, 2017), 
287 (“(t)he legal analysis by the Court may seem, under international law, immaculate and is certainly 
much closer to the orthodoxy of  international and Union law”); Enrico Milano, “Front Polisario and the 
Exploitation of  Natural Resources by the Administrative Power”, European Papers 2, 3 (2017): 966 (“it is 
submitted that the judgment of  the Court of  Justice is an important milestone in the search for justice 
of  the Sahrawi people and should be seen as ultimately Voelkerrechtsfreundlich”); Enzo Cannizzaro, “In 
defence of  Front Polisario: The ECJ as a global jus cogens maker”, Common Market Law Review 55, 2, (2018): 
577, “(Front Polisario) could silently contribute to the development of  one of  the most controversial 
doctrines in international law, namely jus cogens”); Andrea Mensi, “The Case Western Sahara Campaign 
UK and the International and Institutional Coherence of  European Union External Action. Opening 
Pandora’s Box ?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 23, 4, (2018): 549 (“(t)he case represents a landmark 
decision on the relationship between the European Union and principles of  customary international 
law”); Eva Kassoti, “The Council v. Fron Polisario”, European Papers 23, 2 (2017): 41, and “The EU and 
Western Sahara: An Assessment of  Recent Developments”, European Law Review 43, 5 (2018): 759 (“the 
Court of  Justice´s reliance on international law was “selective and artificial”); Jed Odermatt, “Council of  
the European Union v. Front Populaire pour la liberation de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front 
Polisario) Case C-104/16”, American Journal of  International Law 111 (2017): 737-38 (“(Front Polisario) 
is an example of  the Court «instrumentalizing» international law”); Peter Hilpold, “Self-Determination 
and the European Courts: The Front Polisario Case or the Unintended Awakening of  a Giant”, European 
Papers 2 (2017): 908 (“(t)hough purportedly relying on international law (the) findings by the EU courts 
are, however, not always really convincing from the viewpoint of  the international legal order”); Javier 
Andrés González Vega, “La guerra de los mundos: realidad versus formalismo jurídico o el poder de la 
interpretación (a propósito de la sentencia TJUE de 27 de febrero de 2018, Western Sahara Campaign 
UK, C-266/16)”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 60 (2018): 515 (“the judgment of  the Court (…) 
lies in a strictly formal appreciation of  the case”); Rachel Frid de Vries, “EU Judicial Review of  Trade 
Agreements involving Disputed Territories: Lessons from the Front Polisario Judgments”, 24, 2 (2018): 
496 (“EU Courts’ application of  (public international law) principles left much to be desired”).
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2019
114 Francisco Pereira Coutinho
V. The invalidity of  the new generation of  EU/Morocco 
agreements applicable to Western Sahara 
Morocco retaliated to the General Court’s Front Polisario ruling by suspending 
contacts with the EU in February 2016. A Cabinet statement declared that “Morocco 
cannot accept to be treated as a subject of  a judicial process and to be buffeted 
between European institutions (…). Continuing in that position would deeply 
threaten the mutual trust and even the continuation of  the partnership between the 
two sides.”68
A solution to the political turmoil quickly started to emerge. On the very day of  
the Court of  Justice’s decisions on the non-applicability to Western Sahara of  EU/
Morocco agreements, the EU High Representative and the Moroccan Minister for 
Foreign Affairs issued joint statements where they took notice of  the rulings and 
confirmed “their commitment to the strategic partnership between Morocco and the 
EU and their determination to preserve and reinforce it”.69 
Pressured by Spain and France, 70  the Commission asked the Council for a 
mandate to negotiate with Morocco the inclusion of  Western Sahara within the 
territorial scope of  the EU/Morocco agreements affected by the rulings of  the 
Court of  Justice.71 Through agreements signed on 25 October 201872 and 14 January 
201973, products originating in Western Sahara were given preferential treatment on 
68 Aziz El Yaakoubi, “Morocco suspends contacts with EU over court ruling on farm trade”, Reuters, 
February 25, 2016, available at https://www.reuters.com/Article/us-eu-morocco-westernsahara-
idUSKCN0VY26X (June 13, 2019).
69 See “Déclaration conjointe par la Haute-Représentante de l’Union pour les affaires étrangères et 
la politique de sécurité et Vice-Présidente de la Commission européenne Federica Mogherini et le 
Ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la coopération du royaume du Maroc Salahddine Mezouar”, 
December 21, 2016, available at http://eueuropaeeas.fpfis.slb.ec.europa.eu:8084/headquarters/
headquarters-homepage/18042/declaration-conjointe-par-federica-mogherini-et-le-ministre-des-
affaires-etrangeres-et-de-la_en (accessed on June 13, 2019); “Joint statement by Federica Mogherini 
and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of  the Kingdom of  Morocco, Nasser Bourita”, 
February 27, 2018, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/morocco/40464/joint-statement-
federica-mogherini-and-minister-foreign-affairs-and-cooperation-kingdom_en (accessed on June 13, 
2019).
70 Guillaume Van der Loo, “The Dilemma of  the EU’s Future Trade Relations with Western Sahara”, 5.
71 European Commission, “Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of  
negotiations on the adaptation of  protocols to the Agreement between the EU and the Kingdom 
of  Morocco”, COM/2017/191 final, April 19, 2017; European Commission, “Recommendation for 
a Council Decision to authorise the Commission to open negotiations on behalf  of  the EU for the 
amendment of  the Fisheries Partnership Agreement and conclusion of  a Protocol with the Kingdom 
of  Morocco”, COM/2018/151 final, March 31, 2018. An action for annulment brought by Front 
Polisario against the Council decision that authorized the opening of  negotiations of  the fisheries 
agreement and protocol was dismissed by the General Court, which considered that the effects of  
such a decision are essentially political, and, therefore, cannot be considered as directly affecting the 
legal position of  the applicant pursuant to Article 263 (4) TFEU  (order of  February 8, 2019, Front 
Polisario v Council, T-376/18, ECLI:EU:T:2019:77, para. 30). 
72 Agreement in the form of  an Exchange of  Letters between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco 
on the amendment of  Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Communities and their Member States, of  the one part, and the 
Kingdom of  Morocco, of  the other part (OJ L 34, February 6, 2019, 4–7). The conclusion of  the 
agreement was approved by Council Decision (EU) 2019/217 of  January 28, 2019.
73 Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco, the 
Implementation Protocol thereto and the Exchange of  Letters accompanying the Agreement (OJ L 
77, March 20, 2019, 8-55). The conclusion of  the agreement was approved by Council Decision (EU) 
2019/441 of  March 4, 2019. 
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the same terms of  products covered by the Liberalisation Agreement, and Union 
fishing fleets were given access to the waters adjacent to the territory of  Western 
Sahara. 
These agreements will likely be short lived. Notwithstanding assurances of  the 
EU institutions that the case law of  the Court of  Justice was taken into account,74 
the new generation of  EU/Morocco agreements applicable to Western Sahara are 
invalid under EU law because they are incompatible with Article 3(5) TEU, the first 
subparagraph of  Article 21(1) TEU, Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU and Articles 23 TEU 
and 205 TFEU, which impose on the EU the obligation that its external action strictly 
observe international law.
Although the Court of  Justice affirmed in Front Polisario “the separate and distinct 
status accorded to the territory of  Western Sahara by virtue of  the principle of  self-
determination, in relation to that of  any Sate, including the Kingdom of  Morocco”,75 
the latter did not move an inch on its official position that “the Sahara region is an integral 
part of  the national territory over which it exercises full sovereignty in the same manner as for the 
rest of  the national territory”, and “that any solution to this regional dispute should be based on its 
autonomy initiative”.76
As declared by the UN General Assembly Resolution 34/37 of  21 November 
1979, which is mentioned twice in the Front Polisario ruling of  the Court of  Justice,77 the 
Western Sahara is under “continued occupation” by Morocco.78 It goes without saying 
that, under international law, the occupation and annexation by Morocco of  Western 
Sahara severely impedes the exercise of  the right to self-determination of  the Saharawi 
people, and is therefore, a breach of  Morocco’s obligation to respect that right.79
From the erga omnes character of the right of  peoples to self-determination 
stem obligations which “are by their very nature the concern of  all States” and, “in view of  the 
importance of  the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection”.80 
States are thus “under an obligation not to recognise the illegal situation resulting from the (breach 
of  an obligation erga omnes). They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in 
maintaining the situation created by such (breach). It is also for all States, while respecting the UN 
Charter and international law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the (breach), to the 
exercise by the (…) people (…) of  its right to self-determination is brought to an end”. 81
74 V. g. Press release of  the Council, “EU - Morocco: Council adopts sustainable fisheries partnership 
agreement”, March 4, 2019, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2019/03/04/eu-morocco-council-adopts-sustainable-fisheries-partnership-agreement/ 
(June 16, 2019).
75 Judgment of  December 21, 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C-104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, para. 92.
76 See exchange of  letters between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco accompanying the 
Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco, OJ L 
77, March 20, 2019, 53-55.
77 Judgment of  December 21, 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C-104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, para. 35 and 
105.
78 Para. 5. See also UN General Resolution 35/19 (November 11, 1980), para. 3. Portugal abstained 
in both resolutions.
79 A similar conclusion regarding Israel and the breach of  the right to self-determination of  the 
Palestinian people was reached by the International Court of  Justice in the advisory opinion on the 
Legal Consequences of  the Construction of  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, advisory opinion of  July 
9, 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, para. 122.
80 Id., para. 155.
81 Id., para. 159.
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The duty of  non-recognition derives from the broadly recognized peremptory 
nature of  the right to self-determination82, which not only proscribes third parties from 
recognizing as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of  an ius cogens norm,83 but 
also renders void any international agreements that infringe upon it.84 The purpose 
of  the duty of  non-recognition is to prevent the validation of  an unlawful situation 
by seeking to ensure that a fait accompli, such as an annexation in breach of  the right to 
self-determination, does not consolidate and crystallize over time through the principle 
of  effectivity into situations recognized by the international legal order.85 
 The EU agreed to the extension to Western Sahara agreements concluded with 
Morocco with the caveat that it stands by its position concerning the non-self-governing 
status of  the territory and its right to self-determination.86 In other words, the adoption 
of  agreement does not imply the recognition of  Moroccan sovereignty over Western 
Sahara.87 The EU seems to be advocating that Morocco is the administering power 
of  a non-self-governing territory, with whom it can enter into Treaties that benefit its 
people.88 This is, however, a legal non-starter as not only Spain is the still the sole de 
jure administrative power of  Western Sahara,89 but Morocco has “categorically denied” 
having such status.90 By taking notice of  Morocco’s claim of  Western Sahara as an 
82 See International Law Commission, “Draft articles on responsibility of  States for internationally 
wrong acts with commentary”, Yearbook of  the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, 
85; Federal Constitutional Court of  Germany, order of  October 26, 2004, 2 BvR 955/00, 1038/01, 
97; Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of  Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 133-36. According to Stefan Oeter, “Self-Determination”, in The Charter of  the United 
Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., ed. Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, and Andreas 
Paulus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Vol. I, 316, “it is beyond doubt that self-determination, as a 
purpose and principle of  the UN Charter, constitutes a legally binding norm for all member States of  the UN, as has 
been confirmed by a series of  resolutions of  the (General Assembly) and (Security Council), but also the jurisprudence of  
the (International Court of  Justice), and State practice in the process of  decolonization as well as in the cases of  creation 
of  new States in Europe after 1990”.
83 Article 41 (2) of  Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 
56/83, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83/Annex (December 12, 2001).
84 Article 53 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties.
85 Martin Dawidowicz, “The Obligation of  Non-Recognition of  an Unlawful Situation”, in The Law 
of  International Responsibility, ed. James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson, Kate Parlett (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 678.
86 See exchange of  letters between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco accompanying the 
Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the EU and the Kingdom of  Morocco, OJ L 
77, March 20, 2019, 53-55.
87 Recital 10 of  Council Decision (EU) 2019/217 of  January 28, 2019 and recital 11 of  Council 
Decision (EU) 2019/441 of  March 4, 2019.
88 “(T)he Union does not prejudge the outcome of  the UN political process on the final status of  Western Sahara 
and has consistently reaffirmed its commitment to resolving the dispute in Western Sahara, presently listed by the UN 
as a non-self-governing territory, large parts of  which are currently administered by the Kingdom of  Morocco (…)” 
(emphasis added) (Point 3 of  Council Decision (EU) 2019/217 of  January 28, 2019 and point 4 of  
Council Decision (EU) 2019/441 of  March 4, 2019). 
89 Eva Kassoti, “The Empire Strikes Back: The Council Decision Amending Protocols 1 and 4 to the 
EU-Morocco Association Agreement”, European Papers 4, 1 (2019): 311-12, refers that the UN “still 
recognizes Spain as the de jure administering power of  Western Sahara and Spain has relied on this status to extend its 
international jurisdiction in criminal matters to crimes committed in Western Sahara”. See also Advocate General 
Wathelet, opinion of  September 13, 2016, C-104/96, Council v Front Polisario, ECLI:EU:C:2016:677, 
paras. 188-191, and Advocate General Wathelet, opinion of  January 10, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, 
C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, paras. 225-232.
90 Court of  Justice, judgment of  February 27, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, C-266/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:118, para. 72. Morocco has also denied being an occupying power of  the territory 
of  Western Sahara, which means that this qualification cannot also be relied upon to grant Morocco 
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integral part of  its territory while accepting to enter into agreements applicable to an 
occupied territory, the EU breached its obligation not to recognise an illegal situation 
resulting from the breach of  the right to self-determination.91 
The new generation of  EU/Morocco agreements also breaches the principle of  
the relative effects of  Treaties. According to the Front Polisario ruling of  the Court of  
Justice, the Western Sahara, as a non-self-governing territory, is a third party in relation 
to the EU and Morocco, which means that any agreement between them cannot be 
applicable to Western Sahara in the absence of  express consent by its people.92 
The Council considered that the Court’s requirement of  consent by the people 
of  Sahara was met because in the “extensive” and “wide-ranging” consultations carried 
out in Western Sahara and in Morocco by the Commission and the European External 
Action Service, “the socioeconomic and political actors who participated in the 
consultations were clearly in favour of  concluding the (agreements)”.93 Front Polisario’s 
rejection of  the agreements was qualified as petty politics justified by the feeling that 
the agreements “would affirm the Kingdom of  Morocco’s position on the territory of  
Western Sahara.”94
The objection of  the liberation movement, which is the official representative 
of  the people of  Western Sahara,95 is, by itself, an almost unsurmountable obstacle to 
the fulfilment of  the criterion of  express consent.96 Furthermore, serious doubts were 
cast about the integrity of  the procedure of  consultation of  the Saharawi people, as 
83% of  the Western Sahara civil society actors that were allegedly contacted by the 
Commission and the European External Action Service claimed that they were never 
consulted and have rejected the agreements.97 These doubts were shared by Sweden:
“In view of  the rejections to the consultation process and/or the draft agreement, and particularly 
the objections of  Polisario, the official representative of  the people of  Western Sahara in the 
UN process, Sweden is not satisfied that the outcome of  the consultation process can be said 
treaty-making capacity over the Western Sahara. See Advocate General Wathelet, Opinion delivered 
on January 10, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, para. 252-255.
91 Advocate General Wathelet also considered that, by exploring Western Sahara resources under the 
agreements, the EU has directly breached the principle of  self-determination, and arguably the principle 
of  permanent sovereignty over natural resources as well as the rules of  international humanitarian law 
applicable to the exploitation of  natural resources on an occupied territory (opinion of  January 10, 2018, 
Western Sahara Campaign, C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, paras. 143-186, 256-287). On the question of  
the exploitation of  natural resources on Western Sahara, see Juan Soroeta Liceras, “La posición de la 
Unión Europea en el conflicto del Sahara Ocidental, una muestra palpable (más) de la primacía de sus 
intereses económicos y políticos sobre la promoción de la democracia y de los derecho humanos”, Revista 
de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 34 (2009): 829-42; Sandra Hummelbrunner and Anne-Carlijn Prickartz, 
“It’s not the Fish that Stinks! EU Trade Relations with Morocco under the Scrutiny of  the General 
Court of  the European Union”, Utrecht Journal of  International and European Law 32, 83 (2016): 28-29; 
Ben Saul, “The Status of  Western Sahara as Occupied Territory under International Humanitarian Law 
and the Exploitation of  Natural Resources”, Sydney Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15/81, 
2015, and Enrico Milano, “Front Polisario and the Exploitation”, 953-66.
92 Judgment of  December 21, 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C-104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, paras. 106-
107.
93 Recital 11 of  Council Decision (EU) 2019/441 of  March 4, 2019, and Recital 10 of  Council 
Decision (EU) 2019/217 of  January 28, 2019. (emphasis added)
94 Ibid.
95 UN General Assembly Resolution 34/37 (November 21, 1979), para. 7.
96 Eva Kassoti, “The Empire Strikes Back”, 312 (“Front Polisario’s objections cast considerable 
doubts on whether the criterion of  consent of  the peoples of  the territory was fulfilled in casu”).
97 Western Sahara Resource Watch, “Here, the EU Commission is lying about WSRW – and 93 other 
groups”, June 14, 2018, available at https://wsrw.org/a105x4180 (accessed on June 15, 2019).
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to constitute the free and informed consent of  the people of  Western Sahara”.98
VI. The Portuguese interventions in Front Polisario and Western 
Sahara Campaign
6.1. Member States can participate and influence judicial proceedings before the 
Court Justice of  the EU by lodging written observations in preliminary references and 
by submitting statements supporting one of  the parties.99 
Only three Member States – France, Portugal and Spain – have intervened in both 
Front Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign, and all of  them aligned with the Council and 
the Commission’s positions.
Spain and France’s interventions were very much expected. The fall out of  the 
General Court’s decision – the suspension of  relations with the EU by Morocco – 
was particularly detrimental to the economic and political interests of  Spain (90% 
of  EU fishing vessels in Western Sahara have Spanish nationality)100 and France (an 
unconditional ally of  Morocco on Western Sahara).101
Portugal’s intervention was more surprising given its residual economic interests 
in the waters of  Western Sahara102  and, particularly, the fact that it has always aspired 
to avoid damage caused by the Western Sahara conflict to its diplomatic relations with 
both Algeria and Morocco.103 Lisbon’s recent emphasis on fostering an “economic 
98 Council of  the EU, “Statement by Sweden”, 10891/18 ADD2, July 13, 2018.  
99 See Article 23 and Article 40 of  the Statute of  Court of  Justice of  the EU (Protocol No. 3).
100 Juan Soroeta Liceras, “La posición de la Unión Europea en el conflicto del Sahara Ocidental”, 
836. Spain was given 92 of  the 110 fishing licenses to fish demersal species in the Western Sahara 
waters by Article 1 of  Council Regulation (EU) 2019/440 of  29 November 2018 on the allocation of  
fishing opportunities under the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the EU and the 
Kingdom of  Morocco and the Implementation Protocol thereto. 
101 Philip C. Naylor, “Spain, France and the Western Sahara: A Historical and Narrative Study of  
National Transformations”, in International Dimension of  the Western Sahara Conflict, ed. Yahia H. Zoubir 
and Daniel Volman (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1993), 32, and Yahia H. Zoubir, “Geopolitic and 
Realpolitik as Impediments to the Resolution of  Conflict and Violations of  International Law: the case 
of  Western Sahara”, in International Law and the Question of  Western Sahara, ed. Karin Arts and Pedro 
Pinto Leite (The Netherlands: International Platform of  Jurists for East Timor, 2007), 288-90.
102 Article 1 of  Council Regulation (EU) 2019/440 of  November 29, 2018 granted Portugal 14 (of  
110) fishing vessel licenses for demersal species and a quota of  2% of  the tonnage for large-scale 
small pelagic fishing in Western Sahara waters. In 2008, 15 Portuguese vessels captured 3.051 tonns 
of  fish under the previous EU/Morocco fishing agreement (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 
“Resposta à pergunta No. 201/XI/1.ª. Ofício No. 6976, de 16 de dezembro”, Diário da Assembleia da 
República, Série B, No. 27/XI/1, December 23, 2009, 151).
103 “Taking in consideration the involvement of  two strategic neighbouring countries, Algeria and Morocco, and with the 
objective of  safeguarding the excellent bilateral relations which maintains with both countries, Portugal follows a position of  
strict impartiality (on the question of  Western Sahara)” (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta ao 
requerimento No. 284/X/2.ª. Ofício No. 8917, de 22 de dezembro”, Diário da Assembleia da República, Série 
B, No. 16/X/2, 2.º Supl., de December 28, 2006, 72; Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta 
ao requerimento No. 1290/X/2.ª. Ofício No. 6827, de 30 de abril”, Diário da Assembleia da República, 
Série B, No. 51/X/2, Supl., de July 31, 2007, 45; Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta 
ao requerimento No. 1325/X/2.ª. Ofício No. 5417, de 2 de agosto”, Diário da Assembleia da República, 
Série B, No. 51/X/2, Supl., de August 6, 2007, 38; Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta 
ao requerimento No. 1799/X/2.º. Ofício No. 6448, de 14 de setembro de 2007”, Diário da Assembleia 
da República, Série B, No. 5/X/3, Supl. September 9, 2007, 144). On 9 November 2018, the Portuguese 
Government formally supported the proposal of  the King of  Morocco on the establishment of  a 
political mechanism of  dialogue between Morocco and Algeria, “two countries with whom Portugal 
maintains dense and privileged relations” [Communication of  the Portuguese Government on the 
proposal of  the Kingdom of  Morocco of  establishing a joint political mechanism of  dialogue and 
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diplomacy”,104 as well as the election of  the Maghreb region as a foreign policy priority,105 
had moved it closer to Morocco’s position for resolving the conflict by offering political 
autonomy to Western Sahara.106 However, an intervention in support of  the Council 
in Front Polisario would be hardly reconcilable with Article 7(3) of  the Portuguese 
Constitution that states that “Portugal recognises peoples’ rights to self-determination 
and independence and to development, as well as the right of  insurrection against all 
forms of  oppression”. It would also be at odds with the passionate support in the 90’s 
for the self-determination of  East-Timor, a non-self-governing territory which also 
was occupied and annexed by a neighbouring State (Indonesia).107 
6.2. Accessing the Portuguese interventions lodged in the Front Polisario and 
Western Sahara Campaign cases revealed itself  to be a herculean task.
My first step was to request from the Court of  Justice access to those documents 
invoking the first subparagraph of  Article 15 (3) TFEU, which gives “any citizen of  the 
Union (…) a right of  access to documents of  the Union’s institutions”. The problem 
is that in accordance with the fourth subparagraph of  Article 15(3) TFEU, the Court is 
subject to the system of  access to documents of  the institutions only when exercising 
its administrative tasks.108 Furthermore, Article 42 of  the Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights of  the EU and EU secondary law only recognizes public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents.109 In light of  the above, the Court 
refuses by default access to written statements and observations submitted by Member 
States in judicial proceedings.110 
concertation with Algeria, 9 November 2018, available at https://www.portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/ 
(accessed on June 24, 2019)]. 
104 Ana Catarina Pereira Mendes Leal, “A Diplomacia Económica em Portugal no Século XXI – que 
Papel no Investimento Directo Português no Exterior?”, Negócios Estrangeiros 11.1, (2007): 245-49. 
105 Diogo Noivo, “Portugal and the Maghreb: Time to renew the vows”, IPRIS Lusophone Countries 
Bulletin 16 (2011): 4-6.
106 “(Portugal) noticed with interest the [Moroccan Initiative for the Negotiation of  a Statute of  Autonomy (for Western 
Sahara)] and considered that it is part of  the efforts developed to break the impasse and achieve a fair, durable and acceptable 
political solution to all parties involved within the UN framework” (Final Declaration of  the IX Portuguese/
Moroccan Summit of  26 March 2007, para. 20, quoted in Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 
“Resposta ao requerimento No. 1799/X/2.º. Ofício No. 6448, de 14 de setembro de 2007”, Diário 
da Assembleia da República, Série B, No. 5/X/3, September 9, 2007 145). This stands in sharp contrast 
with the position taken in 1996, when the Portuguese Government declared that a political solution to 
Western Sahara could not be delivered by Morocco and appealed to a swift organization of  a referendum 
on self-determination (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta ao Requerimento No. 1246/
VII/1.ª Ofício No. 2554, de 9 de setembro de 1996”, Diário da Assembleia da República, Série B, No. 36/
VII/1 Supl. October 10, 1996, 222 (19).
107 Francisco Pereira Coutinho e Francisco Briosa e Gala, “David and Goliath Revisited: A Tale About 
the Timor Leste/Australia Timor Sea Agreements”, Texas Journal of  Oil, Gas and Energy Law 10 no. 2 
(2015): 434-36.
108 Access to these documents is governed by Decision of  the Court of  Justice of  the EU of  October 
11, 2016 concerning public access to documents held by the Court of  Justice of  the EU in the 
exercise of  its administrative functions, OJ 2016 C 445, 3.
109 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  May 30, 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.
110 Information on Member States’ positions and arguments before the Court could be obtained 
through the Reports for the Hearing made by the Judge-Rapporteur, but the Court limited access 
to these reports in 1994 and stopped producing them in 2012 (Per Cramér, Olof  Larsson, Andreas 
Moberg and Daniel Naurin, “See You in Luxembourg? EU Governments’ Observations Under the 
Preliminary Reference Procedure”, SIEPS 5 (2016): 17).
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After heading nowhere in the Court of  Justice, I reached for the author of  the 
documents. The representation of  the Portuguese State before the Court of  Justice 
of  the EU is a competence of  the European Affairs Department of  the Portuguese 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.111 My informal request for access was promptly refused 
based on the confidential nature of  the documents, which allegedly dealt with 
institutional matters that have implications on Portuguese foreign policy, and on the 
fact that related judicial proceedings were pending in the Court of  Justice of  the EU.
Weeks later, I attended a conference on Western Sahara held in the Portuguese 
Parliament where I mentioned the content of  the Foreign Office´s reply to my request 
to a Member of  Parliament, Jose Manuel Pureza, who is also a renowned public 
international law scholar. Shortly afterwards, the parliamentary group of  the Bloco 
de Esquerda party, to which Pureza belongs, requested the Portuguese Government 
access to the statement for intervention of  the Portuguese Republic in Front Polisario. 
The request voices the concern on whether Portugal adopted a different, or even 
contrary, understanding concerning the application to non-self-governing territories of  
the principles of  self-determination and relative effect of  Treaties compared to the one 
it had supported in the East Timor case before the International Court of  Justice.112
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ reply referred the parliamentary group to the 
Court of  Justice, where the statement for intervention was sent to, and further states 
that the document does not interfere with the international legal statute of  Western 
Sahara, as it merely questions the competence of  the Court of  Justice to control the 
external relations of  the EU and to review acts of  a third State vis-à-vis the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights of  the EU.113 This is a quite cynic answer given that the Portuguese 
Government is well aware that the Luxembourg Court would never give the Parliament 
access to that document. It is thus a breach of  Article 156 (e) of  the Constitution 
which grants the Members of  Parliament (the Assembly of  the Republic) the power 
“(t)o request and obtain the elements, information and official publications they deem 
useful to the exercise of  their mandate from the Government or the organs of  any 
public entity” (emphasis added).114 
My quest at this point seemed to have reached a dead-end, but the Court of  
Justice’s Breyer decision delivered a couple of  weeks earlier improved my chances. 
The Court ruled that written submissions linked to judicial proceedings drawn up by 
Member States and held by the Commission did come within the scope of  Regulation 
1049/2001, as “documents held by an institution” within the meaning of  Article 
2(3) of  the Regulation.115 Legitimate interests of  the Member States regarding such 
111 Article 11 (2) (b) of  the Decree-Law 121/2011, of  December 29 (Organic Law of  the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs).
112 Grupo Parlamentar do Bloco de Esquerda, “Requerimento No. 180/XIII/2, de 10 de 
junho de 2017”, available  at https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/
DetalhePerguntaRequerimento.aspx?BID=102435 (acessed on June 25, 2019).
113 Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta ao Requerimento No. 180/XIII/2 Ofício No. 4494, 
de 28 de julho de 2017”, paras. 1-2, available at https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/
Paginas/DetalhePerguntaRequerimento.aspx?BID=102435 (acessed on 25/06/2019).
114 This right solely does not include access to documents classified as “State secrets” [J.J. Gomes 
Canotilho e Vital Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, Vol. II, 4.ª Edição (Coimbra 
Editora, 2014), 270], which was not the case of  the interventions lodged in the Court of  Justice.
115 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice of  July 17, 2017, European Commission v Patrick Breyer, C-213/15 
P, ECLI:EU:C:2017:563, para. 46. In para. 38, the Court declared that “the fact that Regulation No. 
1049/2001 does not apply to applications for access to documents in the possession of  the Court of  
Justice of  the EU does not mean that documents linked to that institution’s judicial activity are, as a 
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documents can be protected on the basis of  the exceptions laid down in Regulation 
No. 1049/2001 to the principle of  the right of  access to documents,116 which allow 
the institutions to refuse access to a document, inter alia, where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of  international relations (third indent of  Article 4(1) (a) 
of  the Regulation) or the protection of  court proceedings if  there is not an overriding 
public interest in disclosure (second indent of  Article 4(2) of  the Regulation).
Invoking Breyer, I asked the Commission for access to the statement for 
intervention submitted by Portugal in Front Polisario. My request was again denied. I was 
told that the Portuguese authorities, which were consulted in accordance with Article 
4(4) of  Regulation 1049/2001, had opposed the disclosure of  the document based on 
the exceptions protecting international relations and court proceedings.117 
Firstly, the Portuguese government contended that, although the official position 
on the question of  Western Sahara was respected by the statement, the disclosure of  
the document “outside the context of  the proceedings could be used to question the 
Portuguese position in the international legal order”.118 The Commission apparently 
took this argument at face value and merely informed me that the protection of  
international relations is an absolute exception to the principle of  access to documents.
Secondly, the Portuguese authorities considered that the disclosure of  the 
statement could undermine the proceedings of  a similar case (Western Sahara Campaign) 
which was at the time pending in the Court of  Justice. The Commission did not 
contest this argument and referred to case law of  the Court of  Justice admitting the 
possibility that disclosure of  pleadings relating to court proceedings, which are closed 
but connected to other proceedings that remain pending, may create a risk that the 
latter proceedings might be undermined.119 It further declared that it saw no elements 
capable of  showing the existence of  an overriding public interest in the disclosure of  
the document that would outweigh the public interest in the protection of  the ongoing 
proceedings.120
I then asked the European Commission Secretary General to reconsider the 
position of  the Commission. I argued that the Advocate General’s opinion in Western 
Sahara Campaign was scheduled to be delivered in a month’s time and that meant there 
was no possible risk for the integrity of  court proceedings. Furthermore, I contended 
that the protection of  the international relations of  the State exception should not be 
applied to documents submitted in judicial proceedings which are no longer pending. 
In light of  the principle of  openness and transparency [Article 11(1) TEU], there is 
simply no good justification for the Court of  Justice of  the EU not to publish these 
documents in e-Curia as a rule. Even the International Court of  Justice solely has 
discretion on whether the State’s written submissions are accessible to the public on or 
after the opening of  the oral proceedings.121 The case at hand, in which the Portuguese 
matter of  principle, outside the scope of  the regulation where they are in the possession of  the EU 
institutions listed in the regulation, such as the Commission.”
116 Id., para. 39.
117 European Commission, Ref.Ares(2017)5265127, October 27, 2017, 1.
118 Id., p. 2.
119 Judgment of  September 21, 2010, Sweden and Others v API and Commission, C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P 
and C-532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, para. 132. 
120 European Commission, “Your request of  4 September 2017 registered under reference GestDem 
2017/5020”, Ref.Ares(2017)5265127, October 27, 2017, 2-3.
121 Articles 53 and 106 of  the Rules of  the International Court of  Justice, adopted on April 14, 1978 
(entered into force on July 1, 1978). All of  the State’s written submissions are available on the website 
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Government somewhat contradictorily declared that its pleadings respected the official 
position on Western Sahara but at the same time could be used to question that same 
position, shows that documents, which should be in the public domain, cannot be 
enclosed by an arbitrary qualification by a State of  what it considers to affect its 
international relations. 
In response, the Commission’s Secretary General informed me that the Portuguese 
authorities, which were again consulted, had a change of  heart and agreed to partial 
disclosure of  the statement for intervention submitted in Front Polisario. The limited 
undisclosed parts of  the document were redacted on the basis of  the exceptions relating 
to the protection of  international relations and court proceedings. The Portuguese 
Government considered that full disclosure of  the document would undermine the 
position of  the country; “in the ongoing discussions under the auspices of  the UN 
concerning the issue of  Western Sahara” and the proceedings in the pending Western 
Sahara Campaign case in the Court of  Justice. The Commission again agreed with the 
arguments of  the Portuguese authorities stating that the undisclosed parts of  the 
document risked “disturbing the negotiating equilibrium” of  the ongoing discussions 
within the UN. Full disclosure would also breach the principles of  equality of  arms 
and fair trial because “the premature disclosure of  the redacted parts of  the document 
concerned could provoke a public debate on the position of  the Portuguese authorities 
in (the discussions in the UN) and the criticism deriving therefrom could influence the 
position defended in the courts of  the Union calling into question the equality of  the 
parties and undermining the principle (of) the proper administration of  justice”.122
The arguments against full disclosure are ludicrous. The Portuguese statement 
for intervention submitted in Front Polisario has 1937 words. I was sent a document in 
which 39 words out of  two paragraphs are omitted. These paragraphs simply mention 
that the Council did not adopt a manifestly inadequate measure in view of  the objective 
it aimed to achieve and had only the obligation to ensure that the agreement with 
Morocco was not detrimental to the population of  Western Sahara.123 It goes without 
saying that there was not even a remote possibility that these paragraphs could disturb 
the “negotiating equilibrium” of  the UN negotiations over Western Sahara, in which 
Portugal is not even a party at the table, or of  breaching the principle of  equality of  
parties or of  undermining the proper administration of  justice in the Western Sahara 
Campaign case, which was concluded only a couple of  weeks after the Commission’s 
refusal to grant me full access to the statement.
My following request for access to the written observation submitted by the 
Portuguese State in Western Sahara Campaign met a similar response. The Commission 
deferred again to the Portuguese authorities’ argument that full disclosure, not only; 
“would be negatively affecting the international relations by compromising the 
Portuguese position on the question of  the Westerns Sahara as well as misinterpreting 
it at international level”, but also would risk undermining proceedings to yet another 
case (T-376/18) concerning the question of  Western Sahara pending in the General 
Court.124 In the omitted fragments of  the observations, the Portuguese Government 
of  the International Court of  Justice (https://www.icj-cij.org/).
122 European Commission, “Your confirmatory application for access to documents under Regulation 
(EC) No. 1049/2001 – GestDem 2017/5020”, C(2018) 772 Final, February 5, 2018, 1-6.
123 Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Articulado de Intervenção da República Portuguesa no 
Processo No. C-104/16 P Conselho/Frente Polisário”, May 23, 2016, paras. 10 and 21.
124 European Commission, “Your requests of  9 December 2018 registered under referenced GestDem 
2018/6573 and GestDem 2018/6574”, February 7, 2019, 1-3.
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argued that the applicable customary international law principles lacked direct effect 
and could not be invoked by the applicant to question the validity of  a Council decision 
that approved an international agreement.125
Meanwhile, I had formally requested from the Portuguese Ministry for Foreign 
affairs full access to the documents under Article 5(1) of  Law 26/2016, of  22 of  
August, which recognizes to “everyone, without the need to invoke any interest, right 
of  access to administrative documents”. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs considered 
that the written statement and observations were not administrative documents and 
refused my request stating that I should contact the Court of  Justice in order to obtain 
the documents. 
I then presented a complaint against the refusal of  access to the documents 
in the Commission for Access to Administrative Documents (CADA). This is an 
independent administrative entity established in the Portuguese Parliament (Article 
28(1) of  Law 26/2016). On 19 February 2019, in a landmark opinion for transparency 
and governmental accountability, CADA declared that copies of  interventions of  the 
Portuguese State in closed legal proceedings before the Court of  Justice held by the 
Administration are accessible under the Law 26/2016, of  22 of  August.126 In a nutshell, 
CADA considered that documents issued by an administrative entity do not change 
their administrative nature just because they were produced in the context of  judicial 
proceedings.127 Quoting Breyer at length, CADA also declared that it made no sense for 
someone to obtain a document from the Commission but not directly from a Member 
State.128 The arguments against disclosure brought by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
related to the protection of  the international relations of  the Portuguese State and the 
integrity of  judicial proceedings in the Court of  Justice were declared hypothetical and 
not substantiated.129
The Portuguese Ministry for Foreign Affairs accepted CADA’s opinion and – 
approximately two years after my initial request – sent me a non-erased version of  the 
documents on 6 March 2019.
6.3. The statement and the written observations submitted by Portugal in Front 
Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign seem, at first sight, to have been drafted in order 
to avoid taking a position on the legal and political controversies that surround the 
Western Sahara conflict. 
The Portuguese government starts by claiming that its intervention does not; 
“impair or interfere with the situation and the international status of  the Western Sahara 
territory” and is limited to an analysis of  questions related to the scope of  the ius tractandi 
of  the Union130. No position is in fact taken regarding the validity vis-à-vis international 
law of  the EU law acts that approved the EU/Morocco agreements.  Portugal claims in 
Front Polisario the General Court’s lack of  jurisdiction to review the Council’s discretion 
in the field of  the EU’s external economic relations, and rejects the application of  the 
125 Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Observações da República Portuguesa no Processo No. 
C-266/17 Western Sahara Campaign”, July 27, 2016, paras. 16-18 and 22-24. 
126 Opinion 59/2019, of  19 February, case 829/2018, available at http://www.cada.pt/uploads/
Pareceres/2019/059.pdf  (June 23, 2019)
127 Id., paras. 11-13.
128 Id., paras. 16-19.
129 Id., paras. 24 and 28.
130 Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Intervenção da República Portuguesa no Processo No. 
C-104/16 P Conselho/Frente Polisário”, May 23, 2016, para. 5.
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Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the EU in Western Sahara.131 Furthermore, Portugal 
argues in Western Sahara Campaign that the validity of  the EU law acts which approved 
the EU/Morocco agreements could not be determined by reference to Article 3(5) 
TEU, and that the plaintiff  had no standing to invoke rules of  international law.132 
A careful reading of  the written statement and observations reveal, however, an 
intervention of  the Portuguese State which, paying lip service to Moroccan interests 
in the conflict, disregards the “international status” of  Western Sahara and the right to 
self-determination of  the Sahrawi people, particularly when it qualifies Western Sahara 
as a “disputed territory” under “de facto Moroccan administration”.133
Portugal declares in Front Polisario that Western Sahara is a “territory de facto 
administered by Morocco”.134 The concept of  “de facto administering power” does not 
exist in international law,135 and thus cannot be used as a legal basis for the conclusion 
of  international agreements which, unlike the signature of  contracts with private 
companies, is “an attribute of  (…) sovereignty”.136 Its adoption seems to have served 
the sole purpose of  providing an appearance of  legal capacity to Morocco to adopt 
international Treaties applicable to Western Sahara.137 
The qualification of  Western Sahara as a territory under de facto Moroccan 
administration opened the path to the argument that the Council has carte blanche to adopt 
agreements which are not to the detriment of  the population of  a disputed territory.138 
The General Court concluded in Odigitria that the EU had to be recognized a 
wide discretion in the implementation of  its external action in what regards disputed 
territories because:
“If  (it) opposed the claims of  the States concerning the zones over which they claim to have 
jurisdiction or opposed the exercise of  that jurisdiction when a dispute exists, those non-member countries 
would very probably refuse to conclude (…) agreements with the (EU). Moreover, if  the (EU) asked 
for zones to which other States lay claim to be excluded, that move would certainly be interpreted as 
interference by the Community in those disputes”.139
Odigitria concerned fisheries agreements concluded by the Union with Senegal 
and the Guinea-Bissau, which had not excluded from their territorial scope maritime 
zones which were subject to reciprocal claims by the two States. This case law is not 
applicable to Western Sahara where there is no territorial or boundary dispute which the 
EU should refrain from interfering in.140 
131 Id., para. 2.
132 Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Observações da República Portuguesa no Processo No. 
C-266/17 Western Sahara Campaign”, July 27, 2016, paras. 19 and 23.
133 Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Articulado de Intervenção da República Portuguesa no 
Processo No. C-104/16 P Conselho/Frente Polisário”, May 23, 2016, paras. 8-9 and 15.
134 Id., para. 15.
135 Eva Kassoti, “The EU and Western Sahara: An Assessment of  Recent Developments”, 756-57.
136 Advocate General Wathelet, Opinion delivered on January 10, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, 
C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, para. 223 and 232, referring to the Permanent Court of  International 
Justice case SS Wimbledon (United Kingdom and Others v. Germany), judgment of  August 17, 1923 
(PCIJ Series A, No. 1, 25).
137 Eva Kassoti, “The EU and Western Sahara: An Assessment of  Recent Developments”,755.
138 Judgment of  December 10, 2015, Front Polisario v Council, T-512/12, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, paras. 216-
221 and 226. See also Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Articulado de Intervenção da República 
Portuguesa no Processo No. C-104/16 P Conselho/Frente Polisário”, May 23, 2016, para. 21.
139 Judgement of  July 6, 1995, Odigitria v Council and Commission, T-572/93, ECLI:EU:T:1995:131, para. 
38..
140 Advocate General Wathelet, opinion of  September 13, 2016, C-104/96, Council v Front Polisario, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:677, para. 74
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Western Sahara is a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of  Article 
73 of  the UN Charter. It has the exact same status as East Timor had in 1989 when 
Australia concluded an agreement with Indonesia that allowed both parties to share 
the hydrocarbon resources of  the Timor Sea without establishing a definitive maritime 
border.141
East Timor was a former Portuguese colony that was invaded (1975) and annexed 
(1976) by Indonesia.142 Notwithstanding several UN Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions which called for the withdrawal of  Indonesian forces and 
proclaimed the Timorese people’s right to self-determination,143 the occupation lasted 
until 1999.  During this period, Australia moved away from its original condemnation 
of  the invasion144 and, significantly for the case at hand, declared that the start of  
the negotiations for the conclusion of  the Timor Gap Treaty. This signified a “de jure 
recognition by Australia of  the Indonesian incorporation of  East Timor”.145
Portugal reacted by filling a claim against Australia in the International Court of  
Justice where it argued that, by entering into the Timor Gap Treaty, Australia “failed to 
observe (…) the obligation to respect the duties and powers of  [Portugal as] the administering Power 
[of  East Timor] (…) and (…) the right of  the people of  East Timor to self-determination and 
the related rights”.146 Under international law, Portugal contended that, in spite of  the 
Indonesian occupation, Australia could conclude an international treaty applicable to 
East Timor only with Portugal, given its status as administering power of  that non-self-
governing territory.147
The International Court of  Justice refused to consider the merits of  the claim, 
as this would require the determination of  rights and obligations of  a third state – 
Indonesia – in the absence of  the consent of  that state to accept the jurisdiction of  
the tribunal.148  Nevertheless, the court did not miss the opportunity to declare that 
self-determination is an erga omnes right and an essential principle of  contemporary 
international law.149 This decision bolstered the independence cause, which became a 
reality on 20 May 2002, following a referendum held on 30 August 1999, where 78.5% 
of  the Timorese people voted for independence from Indonesia.
141 Treaty between Australia and the Republic of  Indonesia on the Zone of  Cooperation in an Area 
between the Indonesian Province of  East Timor and Northern Australia, (December 11, 1989), 
[1991] A.T.S. 9 (entered into force February 9, 1991).
142 International Court of  Justice, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, 
para. 13.
143 V. g. General Assembly Resolution 3485 (XXX) (December 12, 1975); Security Council Resolution 
384 (December 22, 1975); Security Council Resolution 389 (April 22, 1976); General Assembly 
Resolution 31/53 (December 1, 1976); General Assembly Resolution 32/34 (November 28, 1977); 
General Assembly Resolution 33/39 (December 13, 1978); General Assembly Resolution 34/40 
(November 21, 1979); General Assembly Resolution 35/27 (November 11, 1980); General Assembly 
Resolution 36/50 (November 24, 1981); General Assembly Resolution 37/30 (November 23, 1982).
144 Australia voted for General Assembly Resolution 3485 (XXX) (December 12, 1975), which called 
for the withdrawal of  Indonesian forces.  Regarding the recognition of  East Timor as a part of  
Indonesia, see William T. Onorato and Mark J. Valencia, “The New Timor Gap Treaty: Legal and 
Political Implications”, ICSID Review 59 (2000): 77 (stating that in 1985 Australia became the “only 
western country to formally recognize the Indonesian takeover of  East Timor”).
145 International Court of  Justice, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, 
para. 17.
146 Id., para. 1.
147 Id., para. 10.
148 Id., para. 26.
149 Id., para. 29.
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The decision of  the Portuguese government to go to the The Hague court in the 
90’s was part of  a strategy to raise awareness in the international community over the 
illegal invasion and annexation of  East Timor by Indonesia.150 
This behaviour marks a shocking contrast to the interventions before the 
Court of  Justice in Front Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign, where the Portuguese 
government was at pains to neutralize the only court with jurisdiction to review the 
external action of  the Union in order to ascertain whether that action contributed to 
“the strict observance (…) of  international law (and the) respect for the principles 
of  the UN Charter” [Article 3(5) TEU)]. Contrary to the Portuguese Government 
position in Western Sahara Campaign, far from being programmatic, Article 3(5) TEU, 
read together with the first subparagraph of  Article 21(1) TEU, Article 21(2)(b) and (c) 
TEU, Article 23 TEU and Article 205 TFEU, require compliance with human rights 
and international law on the part “of  all actions of  the EU”.151
The Portuguese Government adamantly refuses to admit to have taken a 
contradictory position on self-determination of  occupied non-self-governed territories. 
The reply to the request for access to the statement for intervention lodged by the 
Parliamentary Group of  Bloco de Esquerda ends with the remark that “by supporting 
the incompetence of  the (Court of  Justice of  the EU), the Portuguese position (in 
Front Polisario) is coherent with the position embraced by Portugal (in the East Timor 
case before the International Court of  Justice) whereas, contrary to the (International 
Court of  Justice), the Court of  Justice of  the EU vocation is not to solve matters of  
international law”.152 This is rather hypocritical as the Portuguese Government knows 
very well that the International Court of  Justice does not have jurisdiction to rule on 
the validity of  the EU/Morocco agreements: Morocco does not accept the jurisdiction 
of  the International Court of  Justice, while the EU is not a State and thus cannot be 
a party in cases in The Hague (Article 34 of  the Statute of  the International Court of  
Justice).
The Portuguese double standard did not go unnoticed to Advocate General 
Wathelet in Western Sahara Campaign, which commented that in light of  the position 
taken in the East Timor case, it was “scarcely surprising that, in its written observations lodged in 
the present case, the Portuguese Government did not adopt a position on the validity of  the contested 
measures”, “(n)or did (…) answer the questions put to it by the Court, or participate in 
the hearing.”153
VII. Conclusions
The written declaration of  the sole abstaining member of  the Portuguese 
Parliament on the solidarity vote on Western Sahara’s self-determination is a perfect 
mirror of  the Portuguese constraints on this question.154 Moral and legal imperatives 
150 Francisco Pereira Coutinho e Francisco Briosa e Gala, “David and Goliath Revisited”, 437.
151 Advocate General Wathelet, Opinion delivered on January 10, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, 
C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, footnote 57, and Judgment of  the Court of  Justice of  June 14, 2016, 
Parliament v Council, C-263/14, EU:C:2016:435, para. 47.
152 Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Resposta ao Requerimento No. 180/XIII/2 Ofício No. 
4494, de 28 de julho de 2017”, para. 3, available at https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/
Paginas/DetalhePerguntaRequerimento.aspx?BID=102435 (accessed on June 25, 2019). 
153 Advocate General Wathelet, Opinion delivered on January 10, 2018, Western Sahara Campaign, 
C-266/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, footnote 191.
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impel the pursuit of  an idealistic diplomacy of  unconditional support of  the free 
exercise of  the right to self-determination of  the Sahrawi people. Political, strategic, 
economic, historical and cultural ties dictate a realpolitik aimed at fostering diplomatic 
relations with Morocco without shunning Algeria, another key stakeholder in the 
Maghreb region. 
The plan to “having a cake and eating it too” diplomacy regarding Western Sahara 
is to follow an “impartial”155, “equidistant”156 and “balanced”157 position in the conflict 
– v. g. by abstaining in UN Assembly General resolutions sponsored by Algeria while 
encouraging the parties to strive for a political compromise.158
Such a strategy has obvious shortcomings which were exposed after the Court 
of  Justice ceased in Front Polisario, the very convenient de facto application of  the EU/
Morocco agreements in Western Sahara. The Portuguese Government followed the 
EU’s path in picking Morocco’s side in the conflict by lodging written interventions 
aimed at neutralizing the Court of  Justice of  the EU and by supporting Council 
decisions that expressly extend EU/Morocco agreements to Western Sahara in breach 
of  EU and international law. These agreements will most likely end again in the Court 
of  Justice of  the EU where the Portuguese Government will have yet another chance 
to either stick to a realpolitik diplomacy, revert to an idealistic diplomacy following the 
Parliament’s lead or play dead in the hope that no one notices it.
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